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Abstract—In this paper, we analyze the four-node relay wiretap
channel, where the relay performs amplify-and-forward. There
is no direct link between transmitter and receiver available.
The transmitter has multiple antennas, which assist in securing
the transmission over both phases. In case of full channel
state information (CSI), the transmitter can apply information
leakage neutralization in order to prevent the eavesdropper from
obtaining any information about the signal sent. This gets more
challenging, if the transmitter has only an outdated estimate of
the channel from the relay to the eavesdropper. For this case, we
optimize the worst case secrecy rate by choosing intelligently the
beamforming vectors and the power allocation at the transmitter
and the relay.
Index Terms—Worst case secrecy rate, two-hop wiretap chan-
nel, amplify-and-forward, interference leakage neutralization
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks are widely-used for communication
nowadays. In order to secure the conversation over this broad-
cast media, secrecy on the physical layer has been investigated
over the past years. A comprehensive overview on the topic
of secrecy on the physical layer can be found in [1], [2], [3].
In multi-hop communications, the wiretapper has usually
access to multiple signal transmissions. Hence the chance of
eavesdropping messages is increased. However, the coopera-
tive nodes can also be an encumbrance to the eavesdropper.
Because of this tradeoff, the multi-hop scenario is interesting
yet difficult. One intuitive idea to enhance secrecy is to confuse
the eavesdropper by artificial noise (AN) signals. This has
been widely adopted including in relay wiretap channels [4],
the four-node two-hop channel and in scenarios with imperfect
channel information [5], [6]. The drawback of the AN scheme
is the dependency on wiretap codes. In order to lift this
dependency, we utilize interference neutralization, which is
a technique to cancel interference algebraically by carefully
choosing the multi-hop strategies [7], [8]. If applied to secrecy
rate scenarios, the technique is called interference leakage
neutralization (IN) [9].
In our previous work [10] with full channel state information
(CSI), we showed that IN performs better compared to AN
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protected schemes, especially in the mid SNR regime. Here,
we extend these results to the case of partial CSI. All nodes
have only local CSI and the transmitter has additionally an
outdated estimation of the channel between the relay and the
eavesdropper. We compute the feasibility conditions of IN
and maximize the worst case secrecy rates by optimizing the
power allocations at the transmitter and the relay. Depending
on the channel realizations and the quality of the CSI, IN can
outperform AN.
Throughout this paper, we use the following notations if
not stated otherwise. Vectors and matrices are marked as bold
lower and upper case letters, respectively. XH denotes the
Hermitian transpose of matrix X . | · | and ‖ · ‖ represent
the absolute value of a scalar and the Euclidean norm of
a vector, respectively. Π⊥X is the orthogonal projector onto
the orthogonal complement of the column space of X , i.e.,
Π⊥X = I−ΠX where ΠX = X(XHX)−1XH . [·]+ describes
the max-function max{·, 0}. The expectation is noted by E[·]
and all logarithms are to the base 2.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. System Model
The two-hop wiretap channel considered in this paper is
based on the non-degraded Gaussian wiretap channel described
in [11]. The transmitter Alice wants to send a confidential mes-
sage over a relay, which is operating in amplify-and-forward
mode, to the intended receiver Bob, while the eavesdropper
Eve tries to decode this message. Therefore, we have a four-
node relay network without direct link between Alice and
Bob as illustrated in Figure 1. The relay and the eavesdropper
have single antenna each while Alice and Bob have nT and
nR antennas, respectively. The receiver does not necessarily
need multiple antennas, i.e. nR ≥ 1. The channels from the
transmitter to the relay and the eavesdropper are denoted by
hR and hE , respectively. The channels from the relay to the
destination and the eavesdropper are then labeled as gD and
gE . All nodes are operating in half duplex mode.
We assume individual power constraints at the transmit
nodes denoted by PS,1 = E[|x|2] (first phase), PS,2 = E[|xn|2]
(second phase) at the source Alice and PR at the relay.
Furthermore, we assume local channel state information (CSI)
at the transmitter, i.e., Alice has perfect knowledge about her
channels to the relay and the eavesdropper. Furthermore, we
assume that the relay communicates the channel estimation
of the channel gE to Alice, which results in Alice having an
outdated gE and we model this as
gE = ĝE +∆gE ,
where ĝE is the estimation on the channel gE and ∆gE is
the estimation error, which is bounded by |∆gE |2 ≤ ǫ. If
the channel estimation is done at the relay using training-
sequences, the estimation error ǫ can be modeled as a scaled
version of the channel estimation mean square error (MSE)
[12], [13]. Bob is assumed to have local CSI, i.e., gD, for
decoding purposes.
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Figure 1. The system model of a four-node two-hop wiretap channel with
a half-duplex relay.
Denote the transmit beamformer of Alice in the first phase
by wS,1. The received signals at the relay and the eavesdropper
in the first phase are given by
yR = h
H
RwS,1x+ nR and
yE,1 = h
H
EwS,1x+ nE,1,
respectively. Accordingly, the received signals in the second
phase at the destination and the eavesdropper are given by
yD =
√
αwHDgD(h
H
RwS,1x+ nR) + nD and
yE,2 = h
H
EwS,2xn +
√
αgE(h
H
RwS,1x+ nR) + nE,2,
respectively, where
√
α is the multiplication scalar at the
relay. The scalars nD, nR, nE,1, and nE,2 are additive white
complex Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance σ2. The
inverse noise power is denoted by ρ = 1
σ2
. The scalar xn is a
signal sent by the source in order to protect the main signal x,
e.g., interference neutralization or artificial noise signals. The
receive beamforming vector at the intended receiver Bob in
the second phase is given by wD. The secrecy rate is then
RS = [C(ΓD)− C(ΓE)]+ , (1)
where we define C(SINR) = log (1 + SINR). The SINR
expressions are given according to the received signals as
ΓD =
αρpS,1|wHDgD|2|hHRwS,1|2
α|wHDgD|2+1
, and
ΓE = ρpS,1
∣
∣
∣
hHEwS,1
∣
∣
∣
2
+
αρpS,1|gE |2|hHRwS,1|2
ρpS,2|hHEwS,2|2+α|gE |2+1
(2)
with
α = ρpR
ρpS,1|hHRwS,1|2+1
. (3)
To satisfy the power constraints at transmitter and relay,
we need to have 0 ≤ pS,1 ≤ PS,1, 0 ≤ pS,2 ≤ PS,2 and
0 ≤ pR ≤ PR, respectively.
In (2), the two observations made by the eavesdropper
can be identified. In the first term, we see the transmitted
signal from the first phase, where Alice sends with power
PS,1 and transmit beamforming vector wS,1. The second
term corresponds to the second transmission phase. Here, the
eavesdropper gets the data signal over the relay, which is
then disturbed by the protection signal sent by Alice and the
amplified noise from the relay.
B. Beamforming Vectors
In this subsection we summarize the optimum beamforming
vectors. In the first phase, Alice applies zero forcing (ZF)
with regard to Eve in order to prevent Eve from overhearing
the signal sent to the relay, i.e., wS,1 = w
⊥
Eve. In the second
phase, Alice sends a signal that only serves the purpose of
protecting the main data signal. As this signal is explicitly
designed for Eve, Alice applies maximum ration transmission
(MRT) to Eve, i.e., wS,2 = w
MRT
Eve . Bob maximizes his receive
signal with maximum ratio combining, i.e., wD = w
MRC.
These three beamforming vectors are defined as
wMRTEve =
hE
‖hE‖2 , w
⊥
Eve =
Π⊥
hE
hR
∥
∥
∥
Π⊥
hE
hR
∥
∥
∥
, and wMRC = gD‖gD‖2
.
III. INTERFERENCE LEAKAGE NEUTRALIZATION WITH
FULL CSI
In the case of perfect CSI, the estimation error zero, i.e.,
ǫ = 0 and ĝE = gE . Therefore the transmitter can construct a
signal xn, that fulfills
−
√
αgEh
H
RwS,1x = h
H
EwS,2xn
and neutralizes the eavesdropped signal at Eve that she re-
ceives over the relay in the second phase.
Applying the beamforming vectors as discussed in Section
II-B, the IN signal is given by
xn = −
√
αgEh
H
Rw
⊥
Eve
hH
E
wMRT
Eve
x. (4)
The secrecy rate with pS,1 = PS,1 is calculated to
1
RfCSIS = C
(
αρPS,1‖gD‖2|hHRw⊥Eve|2
α‖gD‖2+1
)
.
Remark 1. Due to the fact that Eve gets no data signal at
all, Alice can perform conventional channel coding instead of
the more complex secrecy binning that is required to achieve
(1) in general.
1We will show later in Section IV-A that the optimal transmit power of the
transmitter in the first phase is full power, i.e., pS,1 = PS,1.
In order to successfully neutralize the signal at the eaves-
dropper, pS,2 has to fulfill
Ex
[
|xn|2
]
=
αPS,1|gE |2|hHRw⊥Eve|2
‖hE‖2 = pS,2 ≤ PS,2. (5)
In the following, we examine the effect of partial CSI and
the optimum strategies for worst case secrecy maximization,
IV. INTERFERENCE LEAKAGE NEUTRALIZATION WITH
PARTIAL CSI
In order to examine the performance impact of IN due to
partial CSI, we define the information leakage power of the
desired eavesdropping signal,
L(xn) =
∣
∣
∣
hHEwS,2xn +
√
αgEh
H
RwS,1x
∣
∣
∣
2
.
Given only an estimate of gE , ĝE , at Alice, we show in
the following that the worst case information leakage power
is minimized by sending the information again, i.e., xn is a
function of x, and treating the imperfectly known channel ĝE
as if it is known perfectly.
Proposition 1. The optimal IN transmit signal xn with regard
to the minimized leakage power L(xn) and the worst case
channel estimation error |∆gE|2 is given by
argmin
xn
max
|∆gE |2≤ǫ
L(xn) = −
√
αĝEh
H
RwS,1
hH
E
wS,2
x.
Proof: We prove this proposition by contradiction.
Let us assume Alice uses a channel estimation γE to get
the IN transmit signal
xn = −
√
αγEh
H
RwS,1
hH
E
wS,2
x.
The optimization problem is therefore given as
min
γE
max
|∆gE |2≤ǫ
L(γE)
with
L(γE) =
∣
∣
∣
hHEwS,2xn +
√
αgEh
H
RwS,1x
∣
∣
∣
2
=
∣
∣
∣
√
α (ĝE +∆gE − γE)hHRwS,1x
∣
∣
∣
2
. (6)
We need to show that the leakage power is minimized if we
choose γE to the estimated channel ĝE , i.e.,
L(γ∗E = ĝE) ≤ L(γE) ∀γE .
Let us first examine the leakage power with γ∗E = ĝE . Using
(6) we get
max
|∆gE |2≤ǫ
L(γ∗E = ĝE) = max|∆gE |2≤ǫ
∣
∣
∣
√
α (∆gE)h
H
RwS,1x
∣
∣
∣
2
= ǫα
∣
∣
∣
hHRwS,1x
∣
∣
∣
2
.
If we now take a look at some other γE = ĝE + ζ, where
ζ is some estimation error with |ζ|2 ≤ ǫ, (6) becomes
max
|∆gE |2≤ǫ
L(γE = ĝE + ζ)
= max
|∆gE |2≤ǫ
∣
∣
∣
√
α (∆gE − ζ)hHRwS,1x
∣
∣
∣
2
=
(
ǫ+ |ζ|2
)
α
∣
∣
∣
hHRwS,1x
∣
∣
∣
2
.
It is easy to see that L(γ∗E = ĝE) ≤ L(γE = ĝE + ζ) and
therefore it holds that L(ĝE) ≤ L(γE) ∀γE .
From Proposition 1 and the beamforming vectors in Section
II-B, the receive signal at Eve in the second phase can be
calculated to
yE,2 = h
H
Ew
MRT
Eve xn +
√
αgE(h
H
Rw
⊥
Evex+ nR) + nE,2
=
√
α∆gEh
H
Rw
⊥
Evex+∆gE
(
ĝE −
√
ǫ
)
nR + nE,2
and the corresponding worst case SINR is therefore given as
max
|∆gE |2≤ǫ
ΓE =
αρpS,1ǫ|hHRw⊥Eve|2
α(|ĝE |−
√
ǫ)
2
+1
.
An achievable secrecy rate for the two-hop wiretap channel
with partial CSI is given by
R
pCSI
S = C
(
αρpS,1‖gD‖2|hHRw⊥Eve|2
α‖gD‖2+1
)
− C
(
αρpS,1ǫ|hHRw⊥Eve|2
α(|ĝE |−
√
ǫ)
2
+1
)
.
Remark 2. In order to achieve this secrecy rate, a wiretap
code is needed again.
A. Optimization Problem
We are interested in the optimal power allocations at the
transmitter and the relay. Due to the fact that Alice performs
ZF with respect to Eve during the first phase, she will always
transmit with full power pS,1 = PS,1 in order to maximize the
receive signal at the relay. Therefore, it remains to optimize
the power allocations for the second phase at the relay and the
transmitter which maximize the secrecy rate R
pCSI
S .
From (3) and (5), the transmit power at the relay is
pR ≤
PS,2‖hE‖2
(
ρPS,1|hHRw⊥Eve|2+1
)
ρPS,1|ĝE |2|hHRw⊥Eve|2
.
Note that pR correlates with pS,2 as the power values must be
chosen jointly such that the leakage signals from source and
relay add to zero. The maximization problem over the power
pR is given as
max
pR
R
pCSI
S (7)
s.t. pR ≤
PS,2‖hE‖2
(
ρPS,1|hHRw⊥Eve|2+1
)
ρPS,1|ĝE |2|hHRw⊥Eve|2
,
0 ≤ pR ≤ PR.
B. Analysis of Monotonicity
For convenience of notation, let us denote the effective
received SNR at the relay as
ρ̃ = ρPS,1
∣
∣
∣
hHRw
⊥
Eve
∣
∣
∣
2
and define the worst case channel gain as
|g̃E |2 =
(
|ĝE | −
√
ǫ
)2
.
Proposition 2. The optimal power allocation p̃R at the relay
solving the optimization problem (7) is given in Table I, where
pmaxR =
PS,2‖hE‖2
|ĝE |2
(
1 + 1
ρ̃
)
p∗R =
(1+ρ̃)
(√
ǫ‖gD‖2(ρ̃(‖gD‖2−ǫ)+s)s+‖gD‖2(|g̃E |2−ǫ)
)
ρ‖gD‖2(ǫρ̃s+ǫ‖gD‖2−|g̃E |4)
, and
s = ‖gD‖2 − |g̃E |2 .
Case Behavior of R
pCSI
S
with regard to pR Optimal power allocation p̃R
i) |g̃E |
2 ≥ ‖gD‖
2 ≥ ǫ monotonic increasing p̃R = min
(
pmax
R
, PR
)
ii) ‖gD‖
2 ≥ |g̃E |
2 ≥ ǫ
a)
(
|g̃E |
4 + |g̃E |
2 ǫρ̃
)
≥ ǫ‖gD‖
2 (1 + ρ̃) monotonic increasing p̃R = min
(
pmax
R
, PR
)
b)
(
|g̃E |
4 + |g̃E |
2 ǫρ̃
)
< ǫ‖gD‖
2 (1 + ρ̃) quasi-concave p̃R = min
(
p∗
R
, pmax
R
, PR
)
iii) ‖gD‖
2 ≥ ǫ ≥ |g̃E |
2 quasi-concave p̃R = min
(
p∗
R
, pmax
R
, PR
)
iv) |g̃E |
2 ≥ ǫ ≥ ‖gD‖
2 quasi-convex p̃R =







pmax
R
if
(ρ̃+1)(‖gD‖
2−ǫ)
ρ‖gD‖
2(ǫ−|g̃E |2)
< pmax
R
< PR
PR if
(ρ̃+1)(‖gD‖
2−ǫ)
ρ‖gD‖
2(ǫ−|g̃E |2)
< PR ≤ p
max
R
0 otherwise
v) ǫ ≥ |g̃E |
2 ≥ ‖gD‖
2 negative p̃R = 0
vi) ǫ ≥ ‖gD‖
2 ≥ |g̃E |
2 negative p̃R = 0
Table I
THE BEHAVIOR OF THE SECRECY RATE RPCSI
S
WITH REGARD TO pR AND THE OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION p̃R .
The corresponding optimal power allocation p̃S,2 is given by
p̃S,2 =
p̃Rρ̃ |ĝE|2
‖hE‖2 (ρ̃+ 1)
.
The proof is omitted due to space limitations.
From Table I, there are only four different power allocations
p∗R out of the six cases depending on the behavior of the
secrecy rate R
pCSI
S .
As long as the channel gain ‖gD‖2 to the intended receiver
is greater than the uncertainty over the channel |gE |2, i.e., the
estimation error ǫ (case i) to iii)), the secrecy rate is positive.
In particular, in the case where R
pCSI
S is quasi-concave (case ii
b) and iii)), the secrecy rate becomes negative for large values
of pR. If the secrecy rate is monotonic increasing in pR(case
i) and ii a)), the optimal power allocation is either bounded by
the power constraint PR at the relay or by the power constraint
PS,2 at the transmitter.
As soon as the estimation error ǫ becomes greater than the
worst case channel gain |g̃E |2, i.e., the uncertainty about the
channel from the relay to the eavesdropper is greater than the
noise Eve will get in the worst case scenario (from Alice’
point of view), the secrecy rate will become decreasing with
growing pR. As ‖gD‖2 is still greater than ǫ, the secrecy rate
is quasi-concave and has a maximum at the optimal power
allocations p∗R (case ii b) and iii)).
For the case where the worst case estimation error ǫ is
greater than the channel gain ‖gD‖2 (case iv)), the secrecy rate
R
pCSI
S is zero if only a small amount of power is allocated. As
soon as we allocate more power than p0R =
(ρ̃+1)(‖gD‖2−ǫ)
ρ‖gD‖2(ǫ−|g̃E |2)
,
the secrecy rate becomes monotonic increasing as long as
the worst case channel gain |g̃E|2 to Eve is greater than
the estimation error and the channel to Bob. Therefore, the
optimal power allocation is again either bounded by the power
constraint PR at the relay or by the power constraint PS,2 at
the transmitter, as long as these power constraints are greater
than p0R. Otherwise, the secrecy rate is zero and no power
should be allocated.
Finally, if the estimation error ǫ is greater than the channel
‖gD‖2 to the intended receiver Bob and the worst case channel
gain |g̃E |2 to the eavesdropper (case v) and vi)), the secrecy
rate is always zero and therefore no power should be allocated
at the relay and the transmitter. This corresponds to the case
where the transmitter has almost no or no CSI about the
channel from the relay to the eavesdropper. Therefore, Alice
is not able to compute any IN signal in order to null out the
information leakage at Eve. In these two cases, Alice should
use AN in order to protect the second phase.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
For the simulations, we use a geometric channel model with
a path loss coefficient of a = 2. The nodes are placed on a 20
by 20 grid with the following positions:
Alice: [04 10] Bob: [16 10]
Relay: [10 12] Eve: [10 07]
The channels are generated randomly and weighted by the
distances between the nodes. The transmitter is equipped with
four antennas, while the receiver has only two antennas. The
power constraints at the transmitter and the relay are set to
PS,1 = PS,2 = PR = 10 dB. The maximum estimation error
ǫ over the channel gE is calculated to ǫ =
1
SNR2
+ δ, where δ
is a constant which represents the delay caused by the need
of feeding back the CSI from the relay to the receiver.
The IN scheme for partial CSI (R
pCSI
S ) is compared to
several base line systems:
• The peaceful system without eavesdropper. The capacity
Rp is achieved if Alice performs MRT to the relay.
• The IN secrecy rate RfCSIS with full CSI as presented in
Section III.
• The AN noise scheme, where Alice sends a random AN
signal in the second phase in order to disturb Eve (RANS ).
• The unprotected scheme, where Alice only uses an
optimized beamformer, which is a linear combination
between MRT and ZF (RBFS ) during the first phase.
Note, that the IN scheme is the only scheme that is influences
by the partial CSI on the channel gE as all other schemes do
not transmit over this channel.
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Figure 2. Instantaneous capacity for the peaceful system and instantaneous
secrecy rates for various protection schemes over SNR with nT = 4, nR = 2,
and PS,1 = PS,2 = PR = 10dB.
For the secrecy rate R
IN pCSI
S in Figure 2, where the delay δ
equals zero, the transmitter has instantly the channel estimation
over the channel gE . Although this scenario is quite unrealistic,
we can see clearly, that the IN schemes for full and partial
CSI perform identically well. If the delay is greater than zero,
e.g., δ = 0.0001, the IN scheme for partial CSI is performing
worse than the IN scheme for full CSI in the high SNR
regime. This is due to the fact that with outdated CSI the
system gets limited by the negative term in high SNR. For the
chosen channel realizations, the IN schemes outperform the
AN scheme. Especially in the mid SNR range, the AN scheme
still achieves zero secrecy rates, while the IN schemes achieve
positive rates. Due to the missing protection of the data signal
in the second phase, the beamforming scheme performs badly.
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Figure 3. Instantaneous secrecy rates over SNR for IN protected schemes
with full and partial CSI (δ = 0.0001), nT = 4, nR = 2, PS,1 = PS,2 =
10dB and PR = 50dB.
If we apply a simplified power allocation algorithm, where
the power at the relay and the transmitter in the second phase
are either bounded by the power constraint PS,2 or by the
power constraint PR, we achieve the suboptimal secrecy rate
R
IN pCSI so
S . Figure 3 shows for δ = 0.0001 and PR = 50dB
how this suboptimal scheme performs compared to the optimal
IN scheme for full and partial CSI. For the mid SNR range
the difference between both schemes is marginal, while in the
high SNR regime the gap is growing fast.
VI. SUMMARY
In this paper, we analyzed the four-node relay wiretap
channel, where the relay performs amplify-and-forward and
where no direct link between transmitter and receiver is
available. The transmitter has multiple antennas, which assist
in securing the transmission over both phases. In case of full
CSI, the transmitter can apply IN and prevent the eavesdropper
from obtaining any information about the signal sent. We
showed that if the transmitter has only an outdated estimation
over the channel from the relay to the eavesdropper, IN can
still be applied in certain cases. For these cases, we determine
the worst case secrecy rate and optimize the power allocations
at transmitter and relay. Numerical simulations visualize the
theoretical results.
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